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One of the principle aims of the Working Families￿Tax Credit in the UK was to increase
the participation of single mothers. The literature to date concludes there was approximately
a ￿ve-percentage-point increase in employment of single mothers. The di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
methodology that is typically used compares single mother with single women without children.
However, the characteristics of these groups are very di⁄erent, and change over time in relative
covariates are likely to violate the identifying assumption. We ￿nd that when we control for
di⁄erential trends between women with and without children, the employment e⁄ect of the policy
falls signi￿cantly. Moreover, the e⁄ect is borne solely by those working full-time (30 hours or
more), while having no e⁄ect on inducing people into the labor market from inactivity. Looking
closely at important covariates over time, we can see sizeable changes in the relative returns to
employment between the treatment and control groups.
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11 Introduction
In October 1999, the Working Families￿Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in the United Kingdom
with the intention of "making work pay" for families with children. This so-called "in-work bene￿t"
aimed to encourage certain groups in the economy￿ single parents and low-income couples￿ to partici-
pate in the labor market. In general, WFTC aimed to alleviate poverty at the lower end of the wage
distribution, reduce income inequality and redistribute income by reducing the dispersion of earnings.
The WFTC was a minimum-working-hours based credit for families with children, and although
it was not an innovative policy, it was much more generous than its predecessor, Family Credit,
and extended further up the wage distribution. Spending on WFTC totaled £6.3 billion in 2002/03
compared with only £2.3 billion under Family Credit in 1998/9. Eligibility for WFTC was contingent
on four criteria: household members working a minimum of 16 hours a week; the presence of children;
"low" household income; and ￿nancial assets below £8,000.1 Although the amount of WFTC varied
a great deal with the number and ages of the children, on average, a single-parent household received
£91.98 per week in 2002, compared with £59.48 per week in 1998, while coupled households received,
on average, £80.79 per week in 2002, compared with £59.15 per week in 1998.2
The magnitude and the popularity of this tax-credit policy induced a number of studies on the
labor-supply impact of WFTC (see Brewer and Browne (2006) for an overview of the literature).
The overall conclusion was that the generosity of the in-work credit system was successful in inducing
single mothers to increase their participation in the labor market by ￿ve percentage points. The labor-
market impact of WFTC on single parents (particularly, single mothers) is important to understand
as they were one of the biggest bene￿ciaries of the tax-credit policy. The government targeted this
particular group as it became apparent that there was a shift in the composition of the lowest decile
of the income distribution from pensioners to families of working age, and single parents in particular
(see Goodman (2001)). Figure 1 highlights the di⁄erences in income between di⁄erent family types.
Moreover, by looking at the cross-country employment rates of single mothers in Figure 2, it is clear
1In October 1999, families with a net income below £ 92.90 a week recieved the maximum amount of WFTC, and it
would then taper o⁄ to 55 percent.
2These ￿gures are taken from the "Working Families￿Tax Credit Statistics," Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry
(2003)
2that the UK has one of the lowest.
A common approach for analyzing the impact of tax-credit policies on the labor supply of sin-
gle mothers (for example, Eissa and Leibman (1996)) has been to use the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences
methodology. Using this approach, single women without children are used as a control group and
compared, before and after the policy introduction, to single mothers (the treatment group). This
technique relies on the assumption that the comparison group is a su¢ ciently close match and that
the relative returns to covariates remain similar over time, such that after taking the di⁄erences-in-
di⁄erences, the remaining e⁄ect can be considered as the impact of the policy alone on the treated
group. However, it is quite likely that single women without children are not an appropriate control
group since they are observably and (most likely) unobservably di⁄erent. Moreover, in the case of the
UK, the pattern of employment growth over time for single women without children has been very
di⁄erent from the patterns for those with children. Figure 3 plots the employment rates of single
women without children and single mothers.3 We can see that there has been an increasing trend in
the employment rate of single mothers since the mid-1990s, while the level for single childless women
has been high and has remained fairly ￿ at over the same period. In particular, over the period 1996 to
1999 (the "pre-treatment" period), employment rates increase by 6.5 percent for single mothers and
only 1.6 percent for single childless women. Given these patterns, we may also infer that the compo-
sition of single mothers has been changing over time, making a comparison between these two groups
even more di¢ cult. From this, we may be concerned that the labor-supply estimates of the policy
e⁄ect are somewhat upward-biased. Moreover, there was no noticeable spike with the introduction
of WFTC. After 2000, increases in employment of single women ￿ attened, despite increases in the
basic tax credit each year from 2000 to 2003. In particular, on introduction in 1999, the basic rate
was £52.30 per week and increased to £65.50 per week by April 2002; however, employment rates for
single mothers increased by only 0.8 percent during that period.
In addition to the overall employment e⁄ects of WFTC, we may also be interested in the distri-
bution of hours worked and the transitions into employment from various labor-market states. Since
WFTC was contingent on working at least 16 hours a week, we may expect there to have been a spike
3Our analysis stops in 2003, as WFTC was replaced by the Working Tax Credit.
3after 1999 at the 16-hours point. In addition, since the policy o⁄ered a bonus if the claimant worked
30 hours or more, we may expect some change here too. However, if we look at the hours distribution
of single mothers in Figure 4a, the "post-treatment" (2000-2003) increases in hours worked beyond
at the 16 hour point are very small but, more notably, continuous over the whole time period. The
changes in hours worked can be seen more clearly in Figures 5a to 5c. While fewer single mothers
worked 0-15 hours and more worked 16-29 hours, these patterns have occurred smoothly since the
mid-1990s, with no spikes when WFTC was introduced.4
The aim of this paper is three-fold: ￿rst, to address the concern of the suitability of the control
group to see how the results change when we control for group-speci￿c di⁄erential trends; second, to
see where (along the hours distribution) the changes in the employment of single mothers took place
and from which labor-market state (working 0-15 hours, unemployment,or inactive); ￿nally, we look
at the time-series movements of the relative rates of return of important covariates to employment￿ in
particular, returns to the presence of children (i.e., the treatment variable) between 1993 and 2003.
Overall, when we allow for di⁄erential trends, we ￿nd that the e⁄ect of WFTC on employment falls
to 1.7 percentage points, considerably lower than the literature￿ s estimate of ￿ve percentage points.
We ￿nd that this e⁄ect is borne solely by those working full-time (30 hours or more). In addition, we
￿nd that the policy change had no e⁄ect on those who were inactive. The analysis on the covariates
con￿rms that there has been a continuous fall in the relative di⁄erence between having children and
not having children on the probability of entering into employment. The relative di⁄erences in other
important covariates, such as education, have also been changing over time.
These results o⁄er valuable insight into two key issues: ￿rst, the e⁄ectiveness of policy and second,
the design of the policy. In particular, they imply that the increase in participation is overestimated
using standard techniques. Moreover, the policy was not as well targeted as initially believed, given
that any increase in employment was borne solely by those who work 30 or more hours, while those
who were inactive were una⁄ected by the policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of the tax-credit
reform. Section 3 discusses the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence methodology and describes initial concerns
4See Table A1, which shows more clearly the movements in the hours distribution over time.
4with regard to both the treatment and control groups. In Section 4, we discuss the data and main
descriptive statistics of the treatment and control groups. Section 5 we estimate the e⁄ect of WFTC
on employment and hours. In Section 6, we continue our evaluation of WFTC by looking at the
movements in coe¢ cients over time. Section 7 discusses the implications of these results and tries to
understand why we observed the increases in single mothers￿employment rates before WFTC. Section
8 concludes.
2 The Structure of the WFTC Reform
In this section, we brie￿ y describe the Working Families￿Tax Credit (WFTC) policy, introduced in
the UK in October 1999.
Systems of support for families with dependent children in the UK have been in operation since
the 1970s. Although there were some structural reforms over the years, the eligibility criteria have
generally been based on a family income below a certain level, the presence of children and a low
household savings rate. There were two distinctive di⁄erences between its predecessor, Family Credit
(FC), and WFTC. First, the WFTC was much more generous, exceeding the FC in four ways: an
increase in the credit for children under age 11from £12.35 to £14.85 per week (per child); an increase
in the threshold from £79 to £92.90 per week; a reduction in the taper from 70 percent to 55 percent
and a childcare credit of 70 percent of actual childcare costs up to £150 per week. Figure 6 shows
these relative changes. It can be seen that those who would gain the most were people who were just
at the end of the taper under FC, as they were previously ineligible and were now eligible. In addition,
those with a net income between £79 and £92.90 per week would move from being on the taper to
receiving maximum support, and those who remain on the taper following the introduction of WFTC
would see their withdrawal rate fall from 70 percent to 55 percent.
The second important di⁄erence between Family Credit and WFTC was that the WFTC payment
was made through the wage packet. This was an attractive move because it became more convenient
to distribute and reduced the ￿welfare bene￿t￿stigma attached to the tax credit. In April 2000, the
eligible claimant would claim the approximate tax credit from the Inland Revenue, which would work
5out the amount of tax credit payable. The Inland Revenue would then notify the relevant employer
of the amount of tax credit to be paid, and the employer would pay the tax credit out of the tax and
National Insurance contribution that they would otherwise have forwarded to the Inland Revenue.
3 Di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence Estimation
3.1 The Treatment Group: Single Mothers
The number of single parents increased from 0.5 million in the early 1970s to 1.5 million by 1997,
representing 25 percent of all families with children (see McKnight (2005)). However, this rise in the
number of single parents was coupled with a fall in the employment rate of this group from 50 percent
to 40 percent over a similar period. Some of these changes were attributed to changes in composition
and to demographic factors. Overall, the number of workless households rose to 3.2 million by 1997,
accounting for 18 percent of the working-age households. Approximately a quarter were single-parent
households (see Gregg & Harkness (2003)), making them a target group for government support.
The introduction of WFTC was designed to tackle the lack of work incentive within this group.
The tax-credit policy o⁄ered a ￿nancial incentive for parents to ￿nd and remain in employment for
over 16 hours a week. The structure of the tax credit was such that it incorporated a basic tax credit
of £62.50 (in 2002/3) for those working more than 16 hours, plus an additional supplement per child
(£26.45 for children aged under 16 and £27.20 for those aged 16-18). Overall, WFTC increased the
average bene￿t payable to single parents from £58 a week in 1997 to £92 by 2002. By 2002, 737,000
single parents claimed WFTC, compared with only 341,400 receiving Family Credit in 1997. Since
the majority of these single parents were women, our focus will be on single mothers.
Figure 7 shows how WFTC changed the budget constraint of a single mother with one child. The
reform unambiguously enhanced the probability of participation, as the ￿nancial returns to working
more than 16 hours were greater after the reform. However, the complexity of the budget constraint
and the interaction with other taxes and bene￿ts imply that the overall impact of WFTC on the
labor participation of single mothers is not entirely obvious. Blundell et al (2000) highlight that the
6increase in net income was small for those who worked fewer than 25 hours a week because of the
interaction of WFTC and the Housing Bene￿t. For higher levels of hours worked, the reduction in the
WFTC taper increases the returns to working. For those already working, the labor supply response
to the introduction of WFTC is unclear because the marginal tax rate was unambiguously reduced at
all hours under the reform, though even with WFTC, it remained high (70 percent). This increased
the price of non-market time, causing individuals to consume less non-market time and, therefore,
to increase their hours of work (standard substitution e⁄ect). The income e⁄ect would be negative,
however (assuming that non-market time is a normal good).
In Figure 8, we see the evolution of employment rates among single mothers. It can be seen
that between 1992 and 2002, the employment rate increased from 42 percent to 53 percent and that
there was no obvious spike after October 1999, which would allow us to attribute the increase in
labor supply to the change in the tax-credit policy. Moreover, the basic tax credit increased every
year after its introduction, and yet the increases in employment stopped in 2000. In particular, the
basic rate of WFTC at introduction was £52.30 per week and by 2003, when WFTC was replaced by
the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit, the rate stood at £62.50 per week. Several authors
have acknowledged this trend, but while some have dismissed it as a temporary phenomenon which
would not have continued after 1998 (Leigh (2007), Blundell et al. (2005)), others claim it was an
"anticipation" e⁄ect (Francesconi and Van der Klaaw (2004)). However, there is little evidence (or
￿nancial gain) to suggest that single mothers would have bene￿ted from entering into employment
almost two years prior to the introduction of WFTC. We discuss this in more detail in Section 7.
Finally, because there were various tax and bene￿ts reforms in the late 1990s that targeted sin-
gle mothers, it is di¢ cult to say if these policies had more or less impact than WFTC did on the
employment rate of single mothers. Gregg and Harkness (2003) discuss the introduction of other
policies directed at the low-skilled workers and/or families with children, which also impacted the
employment rates of single mothers. Moreover, given the timing of these policies, it is not possible
to disentangle the e⁄ects to see if the policies were jointly or separately signi￿cant. In particular, the
two other relevant policies, which targeted the entry of low-skilled groups into the labor market, were
7the National Minimum Wage and the New Deal for Lone Parents. The National Minimum Wage was
introduced in April 1999, six months prior to WFTC, to reduce the growing dispersion in wages in
the UK (Dickens and Manning (2002)). The New Deal for Lone Parents, introduced in 1998, o⁄ered
job-search assistance to single parents receiving of Income Support with children under 16.5
The main concern is that it is not clear that WFTC had the unambiguous e⁄ect of increasing
employment among single mothers. In particular, we need to be sure that the methodology used can
control for sure complexities. In the analysis that follows, we will concentrate on the heterogeneity in
the e⁄ect on di⁄erent parts of the hours distribution and the time-series changes in the employment
of single mothers. However, trying to disentangle WFTC from other policies in the same period is
di¢ cult, if not impossible.
3.2 The Control Group: Single Women without Children
The evaluation problem is to identify the e⁄ect of WFTC on the employment of single mothers.
The simple idea behind the di⁄erences-in-di⁄erences (DID) estimator is to measure the growth in
the outcome variable of the treated compared with the non-treated. The estimator compares the
pre-program period, t0, and the post-program period, t1 :
^ ￿ = (￿ Y T
t1 ￿ ￿ Y T
t0 ) ￿ (￿ Y C
t1 ￿ ￿ Y C
t0 )
where ￿ Y T and ￿ Y C are the mean outcome for the treatment and control groups, respectively. However,
an important assumption (relevant for our evaluation) that must hold is that the macro trends must
have the same impact across the treatment and control groups. If there are di⁄erential impacts, it
must be that the two groups have some characteristics that distinguish them and make them react
di⁄erently to common macro shocks.
The control group must be as similar as possible to the treatment group in all dimensions other
than that of eligibility. Most of the literature (Blundell et al (2005), Leigh (2007), Francesconi and
Van der Klaaw (2007), Gregg and Harkness (2003)) uses people without children as a comparison
5The program allowed single parents to meet a personal advisor every two weeks and receive advice on job vacancies,
in-work bene￿ts, childcare arrangement, training and job search techniques.
8group when evaluating WFTC. In particular, the changing employment outcome of single mothers is
compared with that of single, childless women. The assumption made, Eissa and Leibman (1996)point
out, is that DID controls for any contemporaneous shocks to the labor-force participation of single
women with children through the changes in participation for the control group.
Figure 3 shows that this comparison group violates the DID condition of having the same under-
lying trend in the pre-treatment period. We can see that, while the employment of single women
without children is high and has remained steady, the employment rate of lone mothers has been
steadily increasing. Table 1, which gives the descriptive statistics of these two groups in the period
before the introduction of WFTC, reinforces this concern. One important distinction is that 22 per-
cent of single women are highly quali￿ed, compared with only six percent of single mothers, whereas
only ￿ve percent of single women have no quali￿cations, compared with 13 percent of single mothers6.
One possibility may be that low-educated single childless women would be a better comparison
group for single mothers. However, a close inspection of the movements in the employment rates of
that group reveals that the trends are very similar to that of all single childless women. In Figures A1
and A2, we plot the employment rates for low-educated single childless women against single mothers
and low-educated lone mothers, respectively, and ￿nd little similarity in pre-WFTC trends.
In the analysis that follows, we look more closely at the di⁄erential trends and, by close inspection of
changes in covariates over time, at the sizable di⁄erentials (that are changing over time) in observable
characteristics between the treatment and control groups.
4 Data
The empirical investigation is done using the UK￿ s Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS
is a repeated cross-section quarterly survey that contains information on individuals, households and
families. We use data from 1993 quarter 1 (March-May) to 2003 quarter 1 (March-May), inclusive. We
do not go beyond this period since in mid-2003, WFTC was replaced by a di⁄erent tax-credit policy.
The dataset contains information on hours of work, labor market activity and a variety of control
6More description of the descriptive statistics is given in Section 4.
9variables needed for the analysis￿ in particular, the region of residence; age; highest quali￿cation;
ethnicity; the presence of children; the number of children; and the age of the youngest child in the
household. The sample is restricted to single women between 18 and 60 years old. Full-time students,
the sick/disabled or individuals in a government training program are omitted from the sample. The
resulting sample size, after pooling all 41 quarters, is approximately 366,500.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for single women without children in the ￿rst column and
for lone mothers in the second column. There are some clear di⁄erences between the two groups.
Single mothers tend to be, on average, younger than single women without children (24.2 years
versus 27.7 years), and they are more likely to be non-white (seven percent versus four percent). An
important concern is that single mothers are less educated; a higher proportion have no quali￿cations
(13 percent versus ￿ve percent), and a smaller proportion are highly quali￿ed (six percent versus 22
percent). Another troubling distinction is the observable di⁄erences in the employment behavior of the
two groups. Single mothers are likely to work, on average, 24.4 hours per week , while single childless
women work, on average, 35.8 hours a week. Compared with single childless women, single mothers
have a higher probability of being unemployed and inactive (ten percent versus 7.9 percent and 34.1
percent versus 8.5 percent, respectively). Overall, single mothers are less likely to be employed, 48.8
percent compared to 82.8 percent of single childless women. When looking at the hours distribution,
single mothers have a higher probability of working part-time: 15.7 percent of single mothers work
between 0-15 hours, compared with only nine percent of single childless women; and 11.4 percent of
single mothers work 16-29 hours compared with only 7.2 percent of single childless women. Finally,




Following Eissa and Leibman (1996), we use a simple regression-based DID by estimating the following
probit:
Pr(empit = 1) = ￿(￿0 + X
0
it￿1 + ￿2t + ￿3KIDi + ￿4Post1999t + ￿(KID ￿ Post1999)it)
where emp is a dummy equal to one if a woman reported working at least one hour. The vector of
X characteristics includes the region of residence, age (and higher order age squared and age cubed),
highest quali￿cation, ethnicity, the presence of children, the number of children and the age of the
youngest child in the household. We include a real deseasonalised GDP series, t, to control for the
general economic conditions, and we also include seasonal controls. The time trend and the individual
characteristics will control for the observable di⁄erences in the characteristics of the treatment and
control groups that a⁄ect the level of employment. The KID variable simply denotes a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the individual is a lone mother and zero otherwise. Unobservable
di⁄erences are expected to be picked up here and we expect the coe¢ cient, ￿3, be be negative if
single mothers have a lower employment rate than single childless women, even after controlling for
children.7 The Post1999 is a dummy equal to one for any quarter after Spring 2000. The coe¢ cient,
￿4, re￿ ects the change in employment for both treatment and control groups post-WFTC introduction
until Spring 2003.8 Finally, we construct a variable that will capture the treatment e⁄ect by interacting
the post-WFTC, Post1999, variable with an indicator for the presence of children, KID. We are,
therefore, implicitly testing that ￿, the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between Post1999 and
KID; is greater than zero. Our regression results in what follows are obtained from using data from
the ￿rst quarter of 1993 to the ￿rst quarter of 2003.
7In the analysis, we disaggregate the "KID" variable by using the number of children. The omitted category is "no
children" and we include the categories:1 child, 2 children and 3 or more children.
8In April 2003, WFTC was replaced by the Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit.
11Table 2 presents the marginal e⁄ects of the above speci￿cations. Column 1 shows the results for
those aged 18 years and over, and column 2 presents the results for those aged 21 and over. We make
this distinction to account for the possibility that many women may still be full-time students when
under 21. The estimate of the treatment e⁄ect in column 1 suggests that WFTC raised employment by
3.6 percentage points. When looking at those over 21, the result is stronger, at 4.2 percentage points.
These results are signi￿cant at the one percent level and comply with the results in the literature,
which average at ￿ve percentage points (see Brewer and Browne (2006)).
The other covariates in this regression strongly suggest that having children is an important factor
in determining the probability of working. For example, having three or more children reduces the
probability of working by 39 percent relative to those with no children. In addition, having children
under the age of ￿ve reduces the probability of working by 22 percent. Finally, the probability of
working monotonically falls as the level of quali￿cations falls, and non-whites are less likely to work.
However, the speci￿cation used here makes two very big assumptions. First, it assumes that
the coe¢ cient on the child dummy variable remains constant before the introduction of WFTC.
Second, it assumes that the coe¢ cients on other key covariates remain the same before and after the
introduction of WFTC. In other words, we do not allow for any relative changes in the rates of return
of covariates between single mothers and single women without children. In e⁄ect, a violation of these
two assumptions would lead to the interaction term (between the child dummy variable and the post
WFTC period) picking up the e⁄ect of these changes in the coe¢ cients and would bias our estimates
of treatment e⁄ect.
In the following analysis, we look carefully at both of these possibilities. In addition, we look
closely to see who is a⁄ected by the policy change. More speci￿cally, we look to see where along
the hours distribution the strongest impact of WFTC lies. We also look at the impact of WFTC on
di⁄erent labor-market states to see if single mothers are being drawn from inactivity and/or if they
are increasing overall participation (with increases in unemployment).
125.2 Controlling for Di⁄erential Trends
In Section 3.1, we looked at the time-series movements in the employment rates of single mothers
relative to single childless women and it was clear that there were di⁄erential trends in employment
rates. The traditional DID analysis fails to allow for these di⁄erences. Therefore, we extend our
DID analysis to allow for the possibility of di⁄erential trends between women with children and those
without children:
Pr(empit = 1) = ￿(￿0 + X
0
it￿1 + (￿1 + ￿2KIDi)t + ￿3KIDi + ￿4Post1999t + ￿(KID ￿ Post1999)it)
We allow for di⁄erential trends between our control and treatment groups by interacting the KID
with the time trend, t. It can be seen that without controlling for this di⁄erence, the treatment e⁄ect
would be biased upwards:
E[￿jX;:] = ￿ + ￿2(k + k0) > ￿
where (k + k0) represents the average number of periods between the post-WFTC and pre-WFTC
period observations.
The results presented in Table 3 show that once we control for di⁄erential trends for women with
children and women without children, the impact of WFTC on employment falls to 1.7-1.8 percentage
points. All other covariates give a quantitatively similar picture as Table 2, when we do not include
the di⁄erential trend.
These results suggest that the e⁄ectiveness of WFTC seen in the previous section has been ex-
aggerated. A large part of the increase in employment of single mothers estimated (4.2 percentage
points), re￿ ects the changing trend in their attachment to the labor market. In Section 6, we look
more closely at the e⁄ect of the presence of children on employment over the period 1993 to 2003.
135.3 Hours Distribution E⁄ect
Another important concern relates to our understanding of which part of the hours distribution was
a⁄ected by the introduction of WFTC. Given that there was a 16-hour minimum work requirement
for WFTC, one would expect the impact of WFTC to be the greatest on those working at least 16
hours. In this section, we examine at the probability of working fewer than 16 hours (0-15 hours),of
working part-time (16-29 hours), and of working full-time (30 hours or more).
We run the same speci￿cation as we did for employment in Section 5.2 and report the results in
Table 4. The ￿rst column of each group of hours reports the results without controls for di⁄erential
trends. As one might expect, there are no signi￿cant e⁄ects on those working fewer than 16 hours (the
hours threshold); there is an increase of 3.8 percentage points in the probability of working between
16 and 29 hours and an increase of 1.8 percentage points in the probability of working more than 30
hours.
When we control for the di⁄erential trends, the only treatment e⁄ect that remains signi￿cant is
on those working more than 30 hours. We ￿nd an e⁄ect of 1.3 percentage points on working full-time,
at the ten percent signi￿cance level. This is a very interesting result, as it is consistent with the
predictions laid out in Section 3.1, which reported that the net income increase from WFTC was
small below 25 hours of work due to interactions of WFTC with other taxes and bene￿ts.
These results question whether the policy was designed well. Given that the policy targeted those
with no labor-market attachment, one would expect this group to be more attracted to working part-
time. In addition, one might expect that those we observe working 30 hours were probably those in
work before the introduction of WFTC and may have simply increased their number of hours of work.
Although this does not imply that the policy was unsuccessful, it does seem to suggest that the policy
did not a⁄ect the main target group￿ i.e., those with little attachment to the labor market. In the
next section, we look to see whether WFTC increased employment by those previously inactive.
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6.1 Changes in Coe¢ cients over time
The results from the previous section raise questions relating to how the child (treatment) coe¢ cient
changed between1993 and 2003. In conjunction with this, it is also important to look more closely
at the movements of the other (relative) covariates over the same time period. By doing so we can
increase our insight into exactly how the introduction of WFTC a⁄ected employment.
6.1.1 Child Coe¢ cient
To observe how the relative employment probabilities for those with children versus no children
changed between 1993 and 2003, we estimate the following equation for each year:
Pr(empit = 1) = ￿(￿0t + X
0
it￿1t + ￿3tKIDit)
The movements in the coe¢ cient on the presence of children over the period 1993-2003, reported
in Table 5, show a closing gap between women with children and those without children. This is
shown very clearly in Figure 9, which plots the coe¢ cient. The initial gap in employment probability
between single mothers and single women without children is -36 percent. The coe¢ cient starts falling
in 1994 and then, after a small a blip in 1998, it continues to fall to -0.27. One may argue that this
re￿ ects an anticipated WFTC e⁄ect. However, there is no reason to believe that almost two years
before the introduction, people would have reacted to the policy as it would mean giving up a number
of entitled bene￿ts. Another pressing concern is that there were increase in WFTC in 2001 and 2002,
above the rate of in￿ ation, and yet the child coe¢ cient ￿ attened in 2000. We discuss these issues in
more detail in Section 7.
6.1.2 Other Covariates
To look at the changes in other important covariates, we estimate the following:
15Pr(empit = 1) = ￿(￿0t + X
0
it￿1t + ￿3tKIDit + ￿t(KID ￿ X)it)
In Figures 10 to 12 (and Tables A2 to A4), we look at the e⁄ect of the age of children, the number
of children and the relative returns to education between single mothers and other single women,
respectively. First, in Figure 10, when looking at the di⁄erent ages of children, we ￿nd that the
biggest increases are for those with children aged zero to ￿ve years. Although, there was continuous
growth over the ten years, the biggest increase occurred between 1998 and 2000,but then stagnated.
Again, it is surprising that the impact occurred before the introduction of WFTC.
In Figure 11, we look at the e⁄ect of the number of children on employment. The coe¢ cient
of having one, two or three (or more) children seems to be increasing over time. The largest spike,
however, came from those with only one or two children. This may due to the fact that both WFTC
and its predecessor, Family Credit, o⁄er only small supplements per extra child in the household,
reducing the incentive to work. This is true, in particular, if there are two or more children in the
household under the age of ￿ve.
Finally, in Figure 12, we look at the changes in the relative returns to quali￿cations/education
for single mothers versus other single women. By holding the highest-educated as the control group,
there seems to have been some (relative) change between the di⁄erent education group￿ in particular,
between low-educated women with and without children￿ the gap seems to be closing from 1995/6.
6.2 Hours of Work
Another interesting question is: what happened to the hours distribution before and after the intro-
duction of WFTC? Figures 5a, 5b and 5c show the average fraction of people working 0-15 hours,
16-29 hours and 30 hours or more, respectively. It is clear that, while the distributions remained
constant from 1993 to 2003 for single childless women, fewer single mothers are working fewer than
16 hours, and there has been a signi￿cant increase in those working between 16 and 29 hours. These
changes, however, do not appear signi￿cant in our analysis of WFTC because the increase has been
continuous since 1993 and there was no noticeable spike in October 1999. The average number of
16single mothers working 30 hours or more has remained fairly constant since 1996, with only slight
increases during the WFTC introduction period. This corresponds with the small increases we observe
in the regression results.
Changes in Coe¢ cients When we look at the change in the child coe¢ cient for each group of
hours (0-15 hours, 16-29 hours and 30 or more hours), the patterns correspond well to the patterns
seen in Figures 5a-5c. In particular, looking at Figure 13a, we see that, although the relative e⁄ect
of working 0-15 hours was higher for single mothers than for single childless women, the coe¢ cient
fell after 1995 and again after 2000. Figure 13b shows that e⁄ect of being a lone mother on working
between 16 and 29 hours is always relatively higher than for single childless women; however, this was
a continuously growing pattern, with no acceleration in October 1999. Finally, Figure 13c looks at
the change in the child dummy on working more than 30 hours. Here the pattern seems quite similar
to the overall employment pattern in Figure 10. We can see that, although single childless women
are always more likely to work full-time, the relative di⁄erence (after 1995) fell and, after 1998, the
gap closed signi￿cantly. However, after 2001, the gap began to widen again. If the increase in the
probability that single mothers would work more than 30 hours was due to WFTC, one may question
its long-term e⁄ectiveness.
6.3 Labor-Market States
In Table 6 we look at the e⁄ect of WFTC on entering other labor-market states. The results imply
that when we control for trends, the probability of entering unemployment falls 1.7 percentage points.
One may interpret this result in many ways. On the one hand, we would expect WFTC to have
increased all labor-market participation. Thus, it would increase not only employment, but, given
labor-market friction, also job search. On the other hand, we may expect unemployment to have
fallen because people were accepting job o⁄ers less reluctantly and/or searching with more intensity
for a job.
When looking at the e⁄ect of WFTC on inactivity, there seemed to be no signi￿cant e⁄ect. This
is very interesting, as it suggests that women who entered the workforce did not come from inactivity
17but from unemployment, or that they were already employed and now simply increasing the number
of hours worked.
Changes in Coe¢ cients Further analysis in Figures 14a and 14b, which look at the time series
movement of the child coe¢ cient for those unemployed and inactive, respectively, suggests that unem-
ployment of single mothers, relative to single childless women, increased substantively since 1993, then
fell between 1998 to 2000, and later increased again after 2001. This is analogous to the employment
story and suggests that female participation increased throughout the 1990s. The dip in 1998 may be
explained by other labor-market policies introduced, such as the New Deal for Lone Parents, which
assisted lone mothers to search more e⁄ectively for jobs and required that their welfare receipt became
contingent on the search.
Figure 14b, which plots the time series changes in the child coe¢ cient, implies that inactivity rates
of single mothers relative to single childless women fell consistently during the 1990s, but by 2000,
the rate remained constant, at 25 percent.
7 Why did the Child Coe¢ cient Increase?
We have shown that over the period 1993 to 1999, before the introduction of WFTC, the employment
rate of single mothers increased by 7.8 percent and that the relative employment probability of single
mothers to single childless women, ceteris paribus, increased from -0.38 to -0.27 over the same period.
It is important to understand why we observe this increasing trend and to ask if this trend would have
continued in the absence of WFTC.
By 1992, the number of single mothers had increased ￿vefold since the 1970s, to just under 500,000.
However, some of this increase related to changes in attitude. For example, in 1971, a third of couples
who conceived outside marriage then had a "shot-gun" wedding, whereas in 1991, fewer than one in
ten did so. Moreover, for teenagers who conceived outside marriage, almost one half married in 1971
compared with only one in 20 in 1991 (see Burghes (1995)). Other changes included that there were
fewer single mothers in their teens in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Overall, compositional changes and
18changes in attitudes towards single mothers may explain some of the observed changes in employment.
One argument proposed to explain the increasing trend in employment rates for single mothers
was that WFTC was anticipated. In its March 1998 Budget speech, the New Labour Government
announced the introduction of WFTC and other reforms targeted to "make work pay" for low-income
families with children. However, there are three important reasons to question the plausibility that
single mothers would react to this announcement, which came almost two years prior to the actual
policy change. First, we observe increases in employment for single mothers before 1998. Secondly,
there were smaller ￿nancial incentives (and, most likely, income losses) to enter the labor market
before the introduction of WFTC. Finally, there were other policy changes between 1998 and 1999
that a⁄ected lone mothers. We will discuss each separately.
First, there have been a huge number of polices over the last two decades intended to attract
single mothers and, more generally, women and/or the low-skilled, into employment. These ranged
from the introduction of the Equal Pay Legislation in 1970 to the increased ￿ exibility in the labor
market, which promoted part-time work. In addition, the improved nature and quality of childcare
also promoted work among this group of women. Moreover, the 1994 change to Family Credit, which
made it more generous and introduced a bonus amount for working 30 hours or more, also increased
participation (See Duncan (1996)). All of these changes took place before 1998.
A report published by Nobles et al. (1998) looks at the period 1993 to 1997 and shows that there
was an increase in the number of single parents moving from Income Support, due in part, to changes
in Family Credit. They observed that of the single mothers on Income Support in July 1993, only 20
percent remained on Income Support for the whole period. In particular, young single mothers (aged
25 or under) were most likely to come o⁄ Income Support, and they tended to be better quali￿ed.
In their qualitative analysis, the authors observed a positive orientation towards work among single
mothers and discovered that most women had worked (at least for some time) since they ￿rst had
children. The main reasons given for not working were related to childcare (because of the marginal
nature of the work they undertook: short-term, low-paid, with unsocial hours) and the loss of bene￿ts,
neither of which was addressed until after WFTC was introduced.
19Second, the interactions between Housing Bene￿t, Income Support and Child Support (as well as
Income Tax and National Insurance Contribution) imply that single mothers, not previously in the
labour market, would have incurred a great deal of additional costs to enter the labor market with
the anticipation of future payment. In particular, Blundell and Walker (2001) show that although
in-work bene￿ts (before WFTC) provided some ￿nancial incentives to work, the combined e⁄ect of
the 55 percent reduction rate, together with the impact of the Housing Bene￿t, the personal tax
rates and National Insurance Contributions in the UK resulted in implicit tax rates close to 100
percent. The WFTC strengthened incentives by increasing the generosity and the reduction rate. It
also incorporated a new childcare credit of 70 percent of eligible childcare costs up to a limit of £100
(and £150 for two children). None of these additional bene￿ts was available until after October 1999.
It is important to point out that, although WFTC was more active towards "making work pay," the
interactions with other bene￿ts, which strongly o⁄set the e⁄ectiveness of the increased generosity of
WFTC, meant that most of the gain were concentrated in the middle or top of the hours distribution
for single-parent households. For example, the Housing Bene￿t is computed after WFTC, and so
WFTC is counted as income in determining the Housing Bene￿t entitlement, and hence, overall
income. The results in this paper highlight this e⁄ect.
Third, the introduction of the New Deal for Lone Parents in 1998 and the National Minimum Wage
in 1999, which targeted low-income people and, in particular, families with children, implies that they
played an important role in increasing employment amongst this group in the pre-WFTC period.
Thus, it was not the anticipation of WFTC that increased employment after 1998, but a reaction
to the range of policies, that existed around that time. It is of critical importance to encapsulate
these policies into the analysis to avoid overestimating the true e⁄ect of WFTC. With the exception
of Gregg and Harkness (2003), the literature discounts the importance of these policies and attribute
any post-1998 increase in employment to WFTC.
Finally, it is important to question whether the increase in employment observed before October
1999 would have continued in the absence of WFTC. Given the interaction of di⁄erent policy introduc-
tions, the e⁄ect of WFTC is not easy to disentangle, making this a tough question to answer. There
20were, however, increases in the generosity of WFTC between 2000 and 2002 and changes in income
tax and National Insurance rules (such that a ten percent income tax band was introduced and the
two percent National Insurance entry fee was abolished), which meant that there should have been
improved incentives for part-time workers and low-earning workers. However, we observe that over
that period, employment for single mothers ￿ attened and the child coe¢ cient was stable. This may
be because WFTC lacked e⁄ectiveness, or it may be that the e⁄ects were dampened by the increase
in Income Support over the same period and the loss of the Housing Bene￿t.
Overall, although WFTC and even, perhaps, its anticipation seems to have had some e⁄ect on the
employment of single mothers, the e⁄ects have been exaggerated because the lack of attention given to
other policies of the 1990s and, perhaps, di⁄erential contemporaneous shocks between people with and
without children. In addition, we are interested not only in whether WFTC increased employment,
but also in whether the government succeeded in increasing the participation and hours of work of
their target group. By looking at the changes in the hours distribution and the labor-market states, it
is not clear that those with the least labor-market attachment were encouraged into the labor market.
8 Conclusion
The increased use of tax credits as a method of "in work bene￿ts" has raised a great deal of popular
interest in the UK and in many other countries where they have been initiated. In particular, the
success of the program was said to lie mainly in the increase in the employment of single parents.
This paper looks closely at the e⁄ectiveness of WFTC in increasing employment, hours of work and
movements from di⁄erent labor-market states. The evidence suggests that once we control for the
di⁄erential trends in employment between lone mothers and single childless women, who are used as
the control group, the employment e⁄ect from WFTC fell considerably. This is con￿rmed when we
look at the movements of the coe¢ cients over time. Moreover, we ￿nd that the policy did not induce
people from outside of the labor market (i.e. from inactivity)￿ the main target group. Instead, we ￿nd
that any e⁄ect of WFTC is borne solely by those working 30 hours or more.
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TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics - Before WFTC 
 
Variable  Single Childless Women  Single Mothers 
        
Age 27.065  23.928 
   [8.881]  [7.541] 
White 0.956  0.922 
   [0.205]  [0.267] 
Black 0.021  0.048 
   [0.142]  [0.214] 
Asian 0.018  0.024 
   [0.135]  [0.153] 
Other Ethnicity  0.005  0.005 
   [0.071]  [0.073] 
High Qualifications  0.195  0.055 
   [0.396]  [0.227 
Medium Qualification  0.375  0.300 
   [0.484]  [0.458] 
Low Qualifications  0.363  0.516 
   [0.481]  [0.500] 
No Qualifications  0.067  0.130 
   [0.251]  [0.336] 
Hours of Work  34.926  25.167 
   [12.600]  [14.475] 
Work 0-15 Hours  0.090  0.157 
   [0.286]  [0.363] 
Work 16-29 Hours  0.072  0.114 
   [0.258]  [0.317] 
Work 30+ Hours  0.668  0.223 
   [0.471]  [0.416] 
Employed 0.828  0.488 
   [0.378]  [0.500] 
Unemployed 0.079  0.101 
   [0.269]  [0.301] 
Inactive 0.085  0.341 
   [0.278]  [0.474] 
One Child     0.712 
      [0.453] 
  24Two Children     0.221 
      [0.415] 
Three or More Children     0.068 
      [0.251] 
Youngest Child (0 to 5 years)     0.377 
      [0.485] 
Youngest  Child (6 to 11 years)     0.301 
      [0.459] 
Youngest  Child (12 to 16 years)     0.314 
      [0.464] 
Observations* 163812  49907 
 
NOTES: Data from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (1993-1998). Here, we see 
the means and standard deviations in brackets for each group. The sample includes 
individuals aged 18-60. The sample is restricted to working women. 
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TABLE 2: Employment - Basic Regression Results (1993-2003)* 
 
   18 years +  21 years + 
Treatment Effect  0.036  0.046 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
Age 0.045  0.06 
   [0.003]**  [0.004]** 
One Child  -0.075  -0.145 
   [0.004]**  [0.006]** 
Two Children  -0.154  -0.252 
   [0.006]**  [0.008]** 
3 or more Children  -0.26  -0.389 
   [0.008]**  [0.009]** 
Medium Qual  -0.035  -0.043 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
Low Qual  -0.131  -0.141 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
No Qual  -0.432  -0.434 
   [0.003]**  [0.004]** 
Youngest Child 0-5  -0.319  -0.223 
   [0.005]**  [0.006]** 
Youngest Child 6-11  -0.103  -0.07 
   [0.005]**  [0.006]** 
Black -0.078  -0.062 
   [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Asian -0.111  -0.121 
   [0.006]**  [0.007]** 
Other Ethnicity  -0.11  -0.106 
   [0.009]**  [0.010]** 
Trend 0.006  0.008 
   [0.000]**  [0.000]** 
Post 2000  -0.026  -0.036 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
Observations 367699  297908 
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted 
comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, 
White. The coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. ** represents 
significance at the 1% level, * represents significance at the 5% level and 
+ represents 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 3: Employment - Differential Trend Control Regression Results (1993-2003) 
 
   18 years +  21 years + 
   No Trend  Trend  No Trend  Trend 
Treatment  Effect 0.036 0.018 0.046 0.017 
   [0.003]**  [0.005]** [0.003]**  [0.006]** 
Age 0.045  0.045  0.06  0.06 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.004]**  [0.004]** 
One  Child  -0.075 -0.09 -0.145  -0.172 
   [0.004]**  [0.006]** [0.006]**  [0.007]** 
Two  Children  -0.154 -0.171 -0.252 -0.283 
   [0.006]**  [0.007]** [0.008]**  [0.009]** 
3 or more Children  -0.26  -0.278  -0.389  -0.419 
   [0.008]**  [0.008]** [0.009]**  [0.009]** 
Medium  Qual  -0.035 -0.035 -0.043 -0.044 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
Low  Qual  -0.131 -0.131 -0.141 -0.141 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
No  Qual  -0.432 -0.432 -0.434 -0.434 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.004]**  [0.004]** 
Youngest  Child  0-5  -0.319 -0.32 -0.223  -0.223 
   [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.006]**  [0.006]** 
Youngest Child 6-11  -0.103  -0.104  -0.07  -0.07 
   [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.006]**  [0.006]** 
Black  -0.078 -0.078 -0.062 -0.061 
   [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Asian  -0.111 -0.111 -0.121 -0.121 
   [0.006]**  [0.006]** [0.007]**  [0.007]** 
Other  Ethnicity  -0.11  -0.111 -0.106 -0.106 
   [0.009]**  [0.009]** [0.010]**  [0.010]** 
Trend  0.006 0.005 0.008 0.005 
   [0.000]**  [0.001]** [0.000]**  [0.001]** 
Post  2000  -0.026 -0.019 -0.036 -0.023 
   [0.003]**  [0.004]** [0.003]**  [0.004]** 
Trend_Child     0.004     0.007 
      [0.001]**    [0.001]** 
Observations  367699 367699 297908 297908 
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted 
comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, 
White. The coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. ** represents 
significance at the 1% level, * represents significance at the 5% level and 
+ represents 
significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 4: Hours Distribution Regression Results (1993-2003) 
 
   Work 0-15 Hours  Work 16-29 Hours  Work 30+ Hours 
   No Trend  Trend  No Trend Trend No  Trend Trend 
Treatment  Effect 0.002 -0.002 0.038 -0.001 0.018 0.013 
   [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.003]**  [0.004] [0.005]**  [0.008]+ 
Age  -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.008 0.088  0.088 
   [0.002]**  [0.002]** [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.005]** [0.005]** 
One  Child  0.044 0.041 0.078 0.043 -0.245  -0.249 
   [0.003]**  [0.004]** [0.004]**  [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.008]** 
Two Children  0.064  0.059  0.066  0.03  -0.393  -0.396 
   [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.006]** [0.007]** 
3 or more Children  0.04  0.036  0.01  -0.017  -0.462  -0.464 
   [0.005]**  [0.005]** [0.004]*  [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.007]** 
Medium  Qual  0.003  0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.025 -0.025 
   [0.001]*  [0.001]*  [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]** 
Low Qual  0  0  -0.01  -0.01  -0.116  -0.116 
   [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]**  [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]** 
No  Qual  -0.01  -0.01  -0.035 -0.035 -0.397 -0.397 
   [0.001]**  [0.001]** [0.001]**  [0.001]** [0.003]** [0.003]** 
Youngest  Child  0-5  0.013 0.013 0.032 0.032 -0.33 -0.33 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.004]**  [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** 
Youngest  Child  6-11  0.024 0.024 0.048 0.048 -0.167  -0.167 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.004]**  [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.007]** 
Black -0.006  -0.006  0.006  0.007  -0.057  -0.057 
   [0.002]**  [0.002]** [0.003]*  [0.003]* [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Asian  0.017 0.017 0.001 0.001 -0.129  -0.129 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.004]  [0.004] [0.007]**  [0.007]** 
Other Ethnicity  0  0  0.001  0.001  -0.106  -0.106 
   [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.006] [0.011]**  [0.011]** 
Trend  0.001  0  0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 
    [0.000]** [0.000] [0.000]**  [0.000]** [0.001]** [0.001]** 
Post 2000  -0.006  -0.004  -0.017 -0.003 -0.012 -0.011 
   [0.001]**  [0.002]** [0.002]** [0.002] [0.004]**  [0.004]* 
Trend_Child     0.001     0.007     0.001 
      [0.000]     [0.001]**     [0.001] 
Observations  293868 293868 292088 292088 297969 297969 
 
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted 
comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, 
White. Analysis restricted to those aged 21 years and older. The coefficients and standard 
errors (in brackets) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents 
significance at the 5% level and 
+ represents significance at the 10% level. 
  28 
TABLE 5: Employment - Child Dummy Marginal Effect (1993-2003) 
 
    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Child  -0.358 -0.367 -0.365 -0.349 -0.329 -0.343 -0.304 -0.266 -0.268 -0.266  -0.28 
    [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** [0.005]** 
Age  -0.047 -0.026 -0.026 -0.004  0.01  0.031 0.007 0.008 0.001 -0.011 0.002 
    [0.010]**  [0.010]**  [0.009]** [0.009]  [0.008] [0.008]**  [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Medium Qual  0.008  -0.01  -0.005  -0.033  -0.053 -0.01 -0.053  -0.055  -0.067 -0.05 -0.044 
    [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.009] [0.009]**  [0.009]** [0.008]  [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** 
Low  Qual  -0.081 -0.103 -0.098 -0.129 -0.164 -0.123 -0.166 -0.184 -0.187 -0.168 -0.171 
    [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** 
No Qual  -0.362  -0.401  -0.4  -0.428  -0.474 -0.439  -0.48  -0.492 -0.483 -0.484 -0.505 
    [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** 
Black  -0.118 -0.05 -0.087  -0.109  -0.068  -0.069  -0.076 -0.09 -0.047  -0.067  -0.044 
    [0.016]** [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** 
Asian  -0.047 -0.051 -0.052 -0.098 -0.084 -0.087 -0.136 -0.086 -0.088 -0.094 -0.077 
    [0.020]*  [0.020]*  [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]** 
Other  Ethn. -0.245 -0.104 -0.076 -0.144 -0.044 -0.087 -0.108 -0.128 -0.032 -0.124 -0.087 
    [0.043]**  [0.042]* [0.035]*  [0.038]** [0.034] [0.031]**  [0.034]**  [0.033]** [0.018]+ [0.020]**  [0.019]** 
Observations  27322 27534 36615 36975 37539 38224 38382 37654 40047 39137 38258 
 
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted 
comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, 
White. Analysis restricted to those aged 21 years and older. The coefficients and standard 
errors (in brackets) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents 
significance at the 5% level and 
+ represents significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 6: Other Labor-Market Outcome Regressions (1993-2003) 
 
   Unemployment  Inactivity 
   No trend  Trend  No Trend  Trend 
Treatment Effect  0.002  -0.017  -0.037  0.006 
   [0.002]  [0.002]** [0.002]**  [0.005] 
Age -0.023  -0.023  -0.03  -0.029 
   [0.002]**  [0.002]** [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
One  Child  0.029 0.013 0.113 0.158 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.005]**  [0.007]** 
Two  Children  0.023 0.007 0.208 0.263 
    [0.004]** [0.004]+ [0.007]**  [0.009]** 
3 or more Children  0.024  0.007  0.32  0.38 
    [0.004]** [0.004]+ [0.009]**  [0.010]** 
Medium Qual  -0.002  -0.002  0.073  0.074 
   [0.001]  [0.001]+  [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
Low  Qual  0.015 0.014 0.154 0.154 
   [0.001]**  [0.001]** [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
No  Qual  0.022 0.022 0.447 0.447 
   [0.002]**  [0.002]** [0.004]**  [0.004]** 
Youngest Child 0-5  -0.009  -0.009  0.225  0.226 
   [0.002]**  [0.002]** [0.006]**  [0.006]** 
Youngest  Child  6-11  0.015 0.014 0.057 0.058 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Black 0.062  0.063  -0.013  -0.014 
   [0.003]**  [0.003]** [0.003]**  [0.003]** 
Asian  0.054 0.054 0.046 0.046 
   [0.004]**  [0.004]** [0.006]**  [0.006]** 
Other  Ethnicity  0.053 0.052 0.046 0.046 
   [0.006]**  [0.006]** [0.009]**  [0.009]** 
Trend -0.004  -0.006  -0.001  0.003 
   [0.000]**  [0.000]** [0.000]**  [0.001]** 
Post  2000  -0.001 0.007 0.027 0.005 
   [0.002]  [0.002]** [0.003]**  [0.003] 
Trend_Child     0.004     -0.01 
      [0.000]**    [0.001]** 
Observations  297969 297969 297969 297969 
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted 
comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, 
White. Analysis restricted to those aged 21 years and older. The coefficients and standard 
errors (in brackets) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents 
significance at the 5% level and 
+ represents significance at the 10% level. 
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Figure 1: Average Income by Family Type 
 















Source - Goodman & Shephard (2002) 
 
Figure 2: Cross-Country Single Parent Employment Rates 
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Source - UK Labour Force Survey 
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Source - Blundell & Walker (2001) 
 
Figure 7: Budget Constraint for Single Mothers 
 
 
Source - Blundell et al (2000)One child aged under 11. Hourly wage £4.39 (median for single mother), rent 
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Notes: The dotted line represents a 95% confidence interval.  
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Notes: The dotted line represents a 95% confidence interval.  
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Table A1: Average Hours Worked (% in each group) (1995-2003) 
 
   Single Mothers     Single (Childless) Women  
Hours                                        1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Hours 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0-1                                        0.13 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0-1 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0 0.02 0.01 0.01
2-3                                        0.49 0.47 0.46 0.65 0.5 0.45 0.29 0.26 0.17 2-3 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05
4-5                                        2.21 2.95 2.73 2.53 2.45 1.84 1.59 1.67 1.61 4-5 0.44 0.4 0.39 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.35 0.41
6-7                                        4.43 3.86 3.33 3.51 2.72 2.33 2.09 2.18 2.17 6-7 0.72 0.68 0.63 0.6 0.6 0.46 0.56 0.54 0.65
8-9                                        2.36 2.6 2.43 2.34 2.29 2.36 2.06 2.25 2.08 8-9 1.16 1.08 1.13 1.04 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.9 0.98
10-11                                        2.85 2.85 3.49 2.7 3 2.44 2.29 2.54 2.54 10-11 0.96 0.99 1 1.04 1.07 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.85
12-13                                        2.97 2.91 2.83 2.69 2.68 2.87 2.33 2.75 2.3 12-13 1.02 0.98 1.03 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97 1.08 1.23
14-15                                        1.65 1.76 1.32 1.65 1.63 1.35 1.8 1.6 1.71 14-15 0.55 0.58 0.65 0.61 0.71 0.75 0.65 0.61 0.77
16-17                                        7.8 8.66 7.64 8.52 9.15 9.35 10.47 10.69 10.16 16-17 1.59 1.69 2.07 1.77 1.97 1.89 1.93 2.19 2.39
18-19                                        3.54 3.45 3.81 5.27 5.66 4.83 5.13 4.89 5.02 18-19 0.79 0.87 0.89 0.95 0.91 0.98 1.02 0.91 0.94
20-21                                        6.67 6.65 7.73 7.71 8.47 7.92 8.18 8.51 8.51 20-21 1.52 1.79 1.88 1.93 1.8 2.22 2.04 1.91 2.15
22-23                                        3.14 3.24 3.94 3.86 4.02 5.01 4.76 5.15 5.18 22-23 0.67 0.74 0.79 1.01 0.89 1.02 0.92 0.98 0.94
24-25                                        2.26 2.56 3.23 2.88 2.85 3.55 3.02 3.23 4.05 24-25 0.75 0.78 0.86 0.77 0.89 0.76 0.85 0.88 0.89
26-27                                        3.8 3.96 4.72 3.83 3.99 4.52 4.4 4.64 4.91 26-27 1.74 1.61 1.66 1.75 1.73 1.97 1.75 1.79 1.8
28-29                                        1.86 2.28 2.58 2.16 2.07 2.32 2.69 2.96 2.63 28-29 1.15 1.17 1.12 1.26 1.17 1.2 1.14 1.03 1.02
30-31                                        3.94 4.39 3.96 3.72 4.29 4.55 4.9 5.65 6 30-31 2.88 2.99 2.77 2.64 2.68 2.78 2.67 2.57 3.07
32-33                                        2.26 2.26 2.04 2.23 2 2.17 2.17 2.46 2.28 32-33 1.76 1.79 1.63 1.82 1.87 2.01 1.69 1.66 1.54
34-35                                        1.14 1.19 0.82 1.12 1.25 1.16 1.32 1.55 1.36 34-35 1.26 1.24 1.12 0.93 0.95 1.01 0.91 0.88 1.01
36-37                                        10.19 10.91 9.74 9.24 9.26 9.76 9.85 8.16 9.4 36-37 17.38 17.53 16.51 16.47 16.07 15.57 16.34 16 16.5
38-39                                        15.92 13.91 14.09 14.77 13.76 13.95 14.07 13.48 13.18 38-39 27.21 26.46 26.99 27.71 27.88 28.16 29.32 29.87 28.82
40-41                                        11.66 10.24 10.95 11.59 9.95 9.61 9.6 8.77 8.66 40-41 19.68 19.51 19.22 19.11 19.55 19.15 18.96 19.04 19.14
42-43                                        2.47 2.99 2.7 2.11 2.58 2.48 2.17 1.89 1.79 42-43 5.39 5.63 5.43 5.09 5.22 4.9 4.81 5.06 4.37
44-45                                        2.02 1.8 1.64 1.39 1.28 1.25 1.28 1.21 1.02 44-45 3.47 3.16 3.38 3.05 3.08 3.17 2.96 2.57 2.47
46-47                                        2.32 1.99 1.95 1.76 1.92 1.89 1.82 1.57 1.66 46-47 3.65 4.03 3.93 4.43 4.24 4.2 4.07 3.88 3.55
48-49                                        0.97 1.19 0.99 0.76 1.07 1 0.77 0.93 0.78 48-49 1.92 1.79 1.99 2.11 1.95 1.99 2.04 1.89 2.02
50+                                        0.95 0.9 0.82 0.95 1.09 1.03 0.91 1 0.82 50+ 2.16 2.38 2.72 2.47 2.36 2.5 2.12 2.38 2.42
 
NOTES: Data taken from the UK Labour Force Survey. 
 
  41TABLE A.2.: Employment – Age of Youngest Child Marginal Effect (1993-2003) 
 
                          1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Youngest Child 0-5  -0.486  -0.469  -0.461  -0.434  -0.419              -0.437 -0.385 -0.353 -0.355 -0.357 -0.373
    [0.008]**                      [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Youngest Child 6-11  -0.165  -0.183  -0.203  -0.225  -0.218            -0.243 -0.215 -0.194 -0.2  -0.181 -0.222
    [0.014]**                      [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
Youngest Child 12-16  -0.033  -0.038  -0.015  -0.074  -0.094              -0.098 -0.081 -0.052 -0.056 -0.073 -0.083
   [0.013]*  [0.013]**  [0.012]  [0.012]**  [0.012]**  [0.012]**            [0.012]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]**
Age              -0.004  0.018  0.021  0.028  0.04  0.063 0.035 0.04 0.034 0.018 0.035
   [0.010]  [0.010]+  [0.009]*  [0.009]**  [0.009]**  [0.008]**            [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]* [0.008]**
Medium  Qual                      0.012 -0.011 -0.005 -0.032 -0.052 -0.006 -0.05  -0.054 -0.063 -0.049 -0.038
    [0.010]                      [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Low  Qual                        -0.064 -0.092 -0.085 -0.114 -0.15 -0.109 -0.154 -0.172 -0.172 -0.159 -0.16
    [0.011]**                      [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
No  Qual                        -0.349 -0.386 -0.391 -0.417 -0.467 -0.43 -0.47 -0.48 -0.474 -0.479 -0.498
    [0.013]**                      [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]**
Black                        -0.118 -0.061 -0.097 -0.12 -0.073 -0.062 -0.074 -0.084 -0.037 -0.055 -0.037
    [0.017]**                      [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian                      -0.054 -0.041 -0.059 -0.13 -0.093 -0.1  -0.142 -0.099 -0.107 -0.104 -0.061
    [0.020]**                      [0.020]* [0.020]** [0.022]** [0.019]** [0.020]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.015]**
Other  Ethn.                        -0.251 -0.101 -0.104 -0.145 -0.038 -0.095 -0.115 -0.15 -0.035 -0.132 -0.089
   [0.043]**  [0.043]*  [0.037]**  [0.038]**  [0.034]  [0.032]**            [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018]* [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations  27322                      27534 36615 36975 37539 38224 38382 37654 40047 39137 38258
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted comparison categories are: No Children, 
High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, White. Analysis restricted to those aged 21 years and older. The coefficients and standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents significance at the 5% level and 
+ 
represents significance at the 10% level. 
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TABLE A.3: Employment - Number of Children Marginal Effect (1993-2003) 
 
                          1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
One  Child                        -0.323 -0.314 -0.319 -0.32 -0.305 -0.314 -0.276 -0.234 -0.241 -0.236 -0.249
    [0.009]**                      [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Two  Children                        -0.471 -0.531 -0.481 -0.429 -0.421 -0.448 -0.398 -0.361 -0.354 -0.356 -0.374
    [0.013]**                      [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
3+  Children                        -0.518 -0.547 -0.549 -0.575 -0.532 -0.558 -0.539 -0.487 -0.499 -0.506 -0.55
    [0.019]**                      [0.016]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.012]**
Age                -0.04  -0.012  -0.014  0.008  0.021 0.047 0.021 0.021 0.013 0.005 0.021
   [0.010]**  [0.010]  [0.009]  [0.009]  [0.009]*  [0.008]**            [0.008]* [0.008]** [0.008]+ [0.008] [0.008]**
Medium Qual  0.009  -0.006  -0.003  -0.031  -0.05              -0.005 -0.05 -0.052 -0.063 -0.046 -0.035
    [0.010]                      [0.011] [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008] [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.007]**
Low  Qual                        -0.079 -0.098 -0.094 -0.124 -0.159 -0.114 -0.158 -0.175 -0.178 -0.157 -0.154
    [0.011]**                      [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
No  Qual                        -0.353 -0.383 -0.385 -0.409 -0.456 -0.417 -0.461 -0.472 -0.464 -0.461 -0.481
    [0.013]**                      [0.013]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.010]** [0.011]** [0.011]**
Black                -0.106  -0.042  -0.09 -0.102  -0.064  -0.068 -0.074 -0.084 -0.046 -0.065 -0.041
    [0.017]**                      [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian                        -0.038 -0.041 -0.051 -0.086 -0.075 -0.078 -0.129 -0.085 -0.083 -0.091 -0.073
   [0.020]+  [0.020]*  [0.020]*  [0.021]**  [0.019]**  [0.019]**            [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Other  Ethn.                        -0.251 -0.107 -0.085 -0.145 -0.035 -0.083 -0.101 -0.131 -0.023 -0.125 -0.09
    [0.043]**                      [0.042]* [0.036]* [0.038]** [0.033] [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018] [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations                        27322 27534 36615 36865 37391 38092 38245 37449 39791 38881 37996
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted comparison categories are: No Children, 
High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, White. Analysis restricted to those aged 21 years and older. The coefficients and standard 
errors (in parenthesis) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents significance at the 5% level and 
+ 
represents significance at the 10% level. 
  43  44
                         
 
TABLE A.4.: Employment – Differential Qualification Marginal Effect (1993-2003) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Child                        -0.14 -0.153 -0.167 -0.178 -0.172 -0.236 -0.238 -0.167 -0.185 -0.168 -0.18
    [0.039]**                      [0.039]** [0.025]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Medium  Qual                        0.011 -0.014 -0.008 -0.031 -0.039 -0.004 -0.046 -0.037 -0.052 -0.029 -0.023
    [0.011]                      [0.011] [0.010] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009] [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.008]**
Low  Qual                      -0.048 -0.065 -0.044 -0.073 -0.105 -0.067 -0.126 -0.135 -0.137 -0.12  -0.118
    [0.011]**                      [0.011]** [0.009]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.009]** [0.009]**
No Qual  -0.356  -0.391  -0.38  -0.407  -0.479              -0.453 -0.501 -0.512 -0.514 -0.508 -0.535
    [0.014]**                      [0.014]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.013]** [0.012]** [0.013]** [0.013]**
Med  Qual*Child                        -0.168 -0.138 -0.096 -0.093 -0.123 -0.068 -0.047 -0.095 -0.077 -0.102 -0.102
    [0.045]**                      [0.044]** [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.025]** [0.020]** [0.019]* [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]**
Low  Qual*Child                        -0.276 -0.284 -0.279 -0.248 -0.231 -0.183 -0.114 -0.153 -0.141 -0.149 -0.161
    [0.044]**                      [0.044]** [0.029]** [0.026]** [0.025]** [0.022]** [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.020]**
No  Qual*Child                      -0.191 -0.199 -0.186 -0.158 -0.089 -0.038 -0.002 -0.025 0  -0.018 -0.005
   [0.045]**                      [0.045]** [0.031]** [0.028]** [0.025]** [0.021]+ [0.020] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Age                -0.045  -0.022  -0.019  0.003  0.016 0.034 0.01 0.012 0.004 -0.007 0.004
   [0.010]**  [0.010]*  [0.009]*  [0.009]  [0.008]+  [0.008]**            [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Black                        -0.119 -0.053 -0.089 -0.114 -0.068 -0.071 -0.078 -0.09 -0.045 -0.066 -0.045
    [0.017]**                      [0.015]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]** [0.014]**
Asian                        -0.051 -0.048 -0.053 -0.102 -0.082 -0.086 -0.135 -0.085 -0.089 -0.094 -0.075
    [0.020]*                      [0.020]* [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.019]** [0.018]** [0.017]** [0.016]** [0.016]**
Other  Ethn.                        -0.245 -0.109 -0.083 -0.145 -0.046 -0.088 -0.106 -0.131 -0.033 -0.125 -0.088
    [0.043]**                      [0.042]** [0.036]* [0.038]** [0.034] [0.031]** [0.034]** [0.033]** [0.018]+ [0.020]** [0.019]**
Observations                        27322 27534 36615 36975 37539 38224 38382 37654 40047 39137 38258
 
 
NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted comparison categories are: No Children, High 
Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, White. Analysis restricted to those aged 21 years and older. The coefficients and standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents significance at the 5% level and 
+ represents significance at the 
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